thanks to the diligent work of American code breakers.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in an attempt to slow these developments while we hastily rearmed, took risks that created the conditions and motivation for the surprise attack by Japan against Pearl Harbor, and brought us into World War II.

The foreseeable consequences of a German victory in Europe and a Japanese triumph in Asia were enormous. President Roosevelt had put into effect military and economic policies and plans to rectify in time those dangerously adverse developments. If America's plans were allowed to continue unopposed, the Japanese correctly foresaw defeat for their own strategy. So they pre-empted in a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor that astonished the world by its effectiveness.

Arguably, allowing blame for this disaster to remain on the shoulders of the Hawaiian commanders so as to not cause the American people to lose confidence in the national leadership was justifiable in the circumstances at that time. But it has long since ceased to be warranted.

All the pertinent information regarding the errors committed and misjudgments made is not yet known.

Two examples: The second telephone conversation initiated by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Roosevelt on Nov. 26, 1941, has never been released. There are allegations that in it Churchill forewarned Roosevelt of the coming attack. Information from diaries refers to a midnight meeting between Roosevelt and his advisers in the White House on Dec. 6, but there is no record of what took place.

Even so, what we do know is more than adequate to absolve the Hawaiian commanders of blame. Although risks taken by our leaders brought on the attack, it was mishandled intelligence by both Army and Navy service chiefs in Washington that led directly to the Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor being unready for the Japanese attack.

Sensible command decisions arise above guesswork in direct proportion to the availability of intelligence information. The needed intelligence was in Washington, nowhere else. Washington's negligence in keeping Kimmel and Short fully informed regarding developments was a major failure by our most senior military commanders to discharge their inherent responsibility. And, finally, what Kimmel and Short did in light of the information available to them was sensible and proper.

There have long existed two theories as to the cause, and the view that, regardless of

whatever else may have occurred, both Kimmel and Short used poor judgment that exacerbated the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The first theory is that the mistakes made in Washington were due to bureaucratic bungling. The second theory comes in two versions. The first is that Roosevelt intentionally brought on the war by his hard-line policies, including maintaining the fleet in an exposed position in Hawaiian waters. The second version is that he also knew in advance the date, time and place of the attack. Substantial, but not conclusive, evidence exists that supports each of these two theories. The misjudgments alleged to Kimmel and Short were direct results of their not being kept informed.

In November 1940, Adm. J.O. Richardson (no kin), the then-Pacific Fleet commander, was insistent that retaining the fleet in Hawaiian waters was unacceptably dangerous. Fleet exercises had shown that carrier aircraft could achieve surprise in their attacks against ships in Pearl. Roosevelt's response to Richardson's objections was to replace him with Kimmel.

Roosevelt wanted the fleet kept in Hawaiian waters for basic strategic reasons. Its presence represented American opposition to Japanese incursions in China and threats to Dutch and British possessions in Southeast Asia. The fleet's major units then were four aircraft carriers and 12 battleships. The Pacific fleet's vulnerability to surprise attack was substantially increased in April 1941 when Roosevelt ordered the carrier Yorktown, three battleships and attendant cruisers and destroyers into the Atlantic to improve convoy protection to Britain. Even so, this move was a risk assumed for a rational strategic purpose.
Two other events of signal importance soon followed.

The director of war plans in Washington, with the concurrence of the chief of naval operations, Adm. Harold R. Stark, took control over distribution of intelligence information. His later failure to forward to Adm. Kimmel highly pertinent intelligence being derived from code breaking was an error of enormous significance.   
           
This error was paralleled, for whatever reason, by Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, who similarly failed to inform his subordinate in Hawaii, Gen. Short.
             
Then, in June 1941, German armies invaded the Soviet Union, their destination Moscow.                                         

Our code breakers intercepted messages declaring that, "We Japanese are not going to sit on the fence while you Germans fight the Russians" and that Japan was "commencing preparation for war against the USA and Britain."


Continued on  page  4.

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